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ABSTRACT 
BANKRUPTCY RISK AND THE PERFORMANCE OF MARKET-BASED 
POLLUTION CONTROL POLICIES 
SEPTEMBER 2008 
WEI ZHANG, B.A., NANKAI UNIVERSITY, CHINA 
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor John K. Stranlund 
 
 
 
  We study the impacts of bankruptcy risk on the performance of 
market-based pollution control policies. In Chapter one, we concentrate on emissions 
trading markets. We find that firms that risk bankruptcy demand more permits than if 
they were financially secure. Thus, bankruptcy risk in a competitive market for 
tradable permits causes an inefficient distribution of these permits among firms. 
Moreover, the equilibrium distribution of permits is dependent on the initial allocation 
of permits. Thus, the main reasons for implementing emissions trading markets do not 
hold when some firms are financially insecure. In fact, the inefficiency that is 
associated with bankruptcy risk is worsened if financially insecure firms are given a 
smaller share of the initial allocation of permits. 
  In chapter two, we investigate the influences of bankruptcy risk on 
imperfectly enforced emissions taxes. Under favorable, but not unrealistic conditions, 
 vi
an imperfectly enforced emissions tax produces an efficient allocation of individual 
emissions control; the aggregate level of control is the same whether enforcement of a 
tax is sufficient to induce the full compliance of firms or not, and differences in 
individual violations are independent of firm-level differences. All of these desirable 
characteristics disappear when some firms under an emissions tax risk 
bankruptcy—the allocation of emissions control is inefficient, imperfect enforcement 
causes higher aggregate emissions, and financially insecure firms choose higher 
violations. 
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CHAPTER 1 
BANKRUPTCY RISK AND EMISSIONS TRADING MARKETS 
1.1 Introduction 
  The fundamental value of competitive emissions trading markets, as well as 
other regulatory attempts to restrict behavior by allocating tradable property rights, is 
that they are predicted to produce distributions of individual emissions control 
decisions that minimize the aggregate abatement costs of reaching a predetermined 
environmental quality target. Moreover, the equilibrium distribution of emissions 
control is independent of the initial allocation of emissions permits, giving regulators 
the freedom to use the initial allocation of permits to pursue other objectives, such as 
those arising from equity concerns or the exercise of political power, without 
upsetting the efficiency property of emissions trading (Montgomery 1972). 
  Of course, the performance of emissions trading schemes depends critically 
on the assumption of competitive permit trading. Hahn (1984) was the first to 
demonstrate that market power in an emissions trading scheme would generally lead 
to an inefficient distribution of emissions control responsibilities. Under the 
assumption that all firms expect one are price takers, the total expenditure on 
abatement would exceed the cost-minimizing solution unless the firm with market 
power could receive an amount of permits equal to the number that it chooses to hold 
in equilibrium. If inefficiency is measured by the extent to which abatement costs 
exceed the minimum required to achieve a fixed target, it rises as the initial allocation 
of permits to the firm with market power increases above or decreases below the 
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equilibrium amount it holds. That is, the initial allocation of permits matters, with 
regard not only to equity considerations but also to cost.1
   Stavins (1995) examined the impact of transaction costs on tradable permit 
systems. Assuming that transaction costs are a function of the size of trades, it is 
shown that in the presence of transaction costs total expenditure on pollution control, 
even excluding transaction costs would exceed the cost-minimizing solution if the 
initial allocation deviates from what would be the equilibrium distribution in the 
absence of transaction costs. If marginal transaction costs are constant, the initial 
allocation of permits has no effect on the equilibrium distribution of control 
responsibilities and aggregate abatement costs. However, the presence of variable 
marginal transaction costs would make the equilibrium distribution of control levels 
depend on the initial allocation of permits. Thus, in the presence of transaction costs 
the initial distribution of permits can matter in terms of efficiency, not only in terms of 
equity.2
  The motivation of this chapter is to build the connection between firms’ 
financial status and emissions trading markets via the limited liability effect. As 
market power and transaction costs, we suspect that bankruptcy risk is another source 
of allocation inefficiency. With the continuing application of cap-and-trade into new 
settings, it is virtually certain that regulators will confront, or have already confronted, 
                                                        
1 The literature on market power in emissions trading programs is quite extensive. See 
Tietenberg (2006) for a thorough review of this literature.  
2 A number of authors have considered how transaction costs have affected the performance 
of actual trading programs. Cason and Gangadharan (2003) provide an excellent review of 
this literature. The primary motivation of their paper is to use laboratory markets to test the 
impacts of transaction costs on transferable permit markets. Their results generally support the 
conclusions of Stavins (1995). 
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situations involving financially distressed polluters. Thus, knowledge of how the 
financial health of regulated firms can impact the performance of emissions trading 
schemes is an important consideration in the design and evaluation of these policies.  
  We are certainly not the first to demonstrate that the financial health of firms 
can impact the performance of markets. Brander and Lewis (1986) first examined the 
connection between firms’ financial structure and output market via the limited 
liability effect—firms controlled by shareholders have an incentive to pursue output 
strategies that raise returns in good states and lower returns in bad states. A Cournot 
duopolists model was used in their work, in which the financial structure of the two 
firms are first decided and then output levels are selected taking their financial 
composition as given. Assuming random profits and symmetry between the two firms, 
the equilibrium output of a firm rises with its own debt level and associated 
bankruptcy risk, but decreases with its rival’s debt level. 
  We are also not the first to demonstrate that bankruptcy risk may impact 
regulatory designs, including environmental and natural resource policies. Spiegel and 
Spulber (1994) investigate the interactions between the investment and financial 
decisions of regulated firms and the pricing choices of regulators. The regulatory 
process was modeled as a three-stage game in which a regulated firm chooses capital 
structure first, then the market value of the firm’s debt and equity are established in a 
competitive capital market and finally the regulator sets the firm’s price. They found 
that in equilibrium the regulated firm issues a positive amount of debt and hence its 
risk of bankruptcy is positive. The optimal regulated price increases in the firm’s debt 
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obligation and decreases in the firm’s investment level. 
  Damania (2000) explores the link between pollution taxes and the financial 
and output decisions of firms in an oligopolistic industry facing demand uncertainty. 
Following a model analogous to Brander and Lewis (1986), it is shown that pollution 
taxes may induce firms to alter their financial structure, which in turn influences both 
output market and effectiveness of pollution taxes. Since an emissions tax on a 
leveraged firm will not only increase production costs, but also affects the firm’s 
ability to meet its debt obligations, there are circumstances under which highly 
leveraged firms may respond to pollution taxes by actually increasing their output. In 
a more recent work, Damania and Bulte (2006) relate the harvest decisions of firms in 
a fishery to the financial structure of the industry and regulatory control. Contrary to 
predictions about the decision of firms in the absence of bankruptcy risk, they 
demonstrate that the risk of bankruptcy may cause firms to increase their harvests and 
violations of harvest quotas if noncompliance penalties are increased or harvest quotas 
are reduced.  
  To our knowledge our work is the first to examine how the risk of bankruptcy 
affects the performance of tradable property rights regulations. We demonstrate that 
firms under an emissions trading scheme that face a positive risk of bankruptcy will 
demand more emissions permits than they would if they did not risk bankruptcy. 
Consequently, a significant number of financially distressed firms will cause the 
equilibrium distribution of emission control responsibilities to differ from the 
distribution that minimizes aggregate abatement costs. Moreover, the equilibrium 
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distribution of control and the loss induced by financially distressed firms will depend 
on the initial distribution of permits—a larger initial allocation of emissions permits to 
distressed firms will reduce their risk of bankruptcy. Thus, there are welfare 
consequences of the initial distribution of permits that are not present when emissions 
markets do not include financially distressed firms. In fact, distributing a greater 
number of permits to distressed firms reduces the excess aggregate costs of emissions 
control that is due to bankruptcy risk.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In the next section we lay out 
a simple model of a value-maximizing firm that may risk insolvency. In section 3 we 
investigate the effect of financial distress on a firm’s demand for emissions permits 
and demonstrate that bankruptcy risk upsets the efficiency property that is associated 
with competitive emissions trading. In section 4 we demonstrate how bankruptcy risk 
affects emissions markets, particularly the efficiency consequences of the initial 
distribution of emissions permits. We conclude in section 5 with a discussion of the 
policy implications of this work.  
1.2 A Model of a Value-maximizing Firm under Emissions Trading 
  In this section we present a model of a firm seeking to maximize its expected 
value while operating under an emissions trading scheme. Given optimal output and 
input choices, the firm’s profit is ( )(1 )e zπ +  excluding permit payments.  is the 
firm’s emissions and  is a continuous random variable that is independently (but 
not necessarily identically) distributed in the population of regulated firms. This 
random variable reflects the effects of uncertainty on the firm’s profit, such as the 
e
z
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effects of random shifts in the demand for the firm’s output or random changes in 
factor prices. The probability density function of  is  with support z ( )g z [ , ]z z . 
The expectation of  is zero so the firm’s expected profit is simply z ( )eπ . The value 
of  is realized after all production and permit market decisions have been made. z
  We assume that the firm’s expected profit, ( )eπ , is strictly concave in the 
firm’s emissions. In the absence of inducement to control its emissions, the firm’s 
emissions are determined by ( ) 0eπ ′ = , the solution to which is denoted . It will 
become obvious in the next section (particularly footnote 3) that the way we have 
modeled the uncertainty the firm faces implies that it chooses  when it is not 
regulated whether it risks bankruptcy or not. The implementation of an emissions 
trading scheme generates a price for emissions that motivates the firm to reduce its 
emissions below . As is standard, we define the firm’s abatement costs as the 
difference between its expected profit when it does not control emissions and its 
expected profit when it reduces emissions. That is, for , the firm’s 
abatement costs are . Moreover, the firm’s marginal abatement 
cost function is
me
me
me
[0, ]me e∈
( ) ( ) ( )mc e e eπ π= −
( ) ( )c e eπ′ ′− = . We assume that ( ) 0eπ >  for ; that is, the 
firm’s expected profit is strictly greater than zero in the relevant range of emissions. 
[0, ]me e∈
  The firm receives an initial endowment of permits . Each permit gives the 
firm the right to release one unit of emissions. Assume that the enforcement of the 
emissions trading program is sufficient to induce full compliance, so that the firm 
holds the same number of emissions permits as its emissions. The market for 
emissions permits is perfectly competitive so that trade establishes a constant price 
l
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per permit p . The firm’s expenditure or revenue from permit transactions is 
. ( )p e l−
  Here, we focus on one compliance period in which the firm’s financial 
structure is fixed and fully captured by its equity A  and its debt obligation . 
Given a realization of , the value of the firm is  
D
z
   ( , ) ( )(1 ) ( )v e z e z p e l D Aπ= + − − − + .     [1.1] 
If  turns out to be negative, the firm’s losses exceed its equity. It then declares 
bankruptcy and uses its equity to partially pay off its creditors. Apart from losing its 
equity, there are no other costs of declaring bankruptcy. If  turns out to be 
greater than zero, the firm remains solvent. Note that the firm is willing to tolerate an 
operating loss if the loss does not exceed its equity.  
( , )v e z
( , )v e z
  Define a critical breakeven state, , in which the firm’s equity is just 
sufficient for the firm to avoid bankruptcy: 
zˆ
   ˆ ˆ ˆ| ( , ) ( )(1 ) ( ) 0z z v e z e z p e l D Aπ= = + − − − + = .  [1.2] 
Solving for  yields  zˆ
   ( )ˆ 1
( )
p e l D Az
eπ
− + −= − .        [1.3]   
If the realized value of  is greater than , the firm remains solvent; but it is 
insolvent if the realized value of  is less than . The probability that the firm 
avoids bankruptcy is the probability that ; that is, 
z zˆ
z zˆ
ˆz z≥
ˆ
( )
z
z
g z dz∫ . Clearly, the 
probability of bankruptcy increases with . Note that if zˆ zˆ z≤ , the firm is financial 
secure in the sense that it does not risk bankruptcy. At the other end of the range of , 
if 
z
zˆ z≥ , the firm will definitely be insolvent. Obviously, in this case the firm will not 
 7
even bother to begin production. However, in the more interesting cases in which 
ˆ ( , )z z z∈ , the probabilities that the firm will be solvent or insolvent are both strictly 
positive. 
  From [1.3], note that the first derivatives of  are: zˆ
   1ˆ 0
( )A
z
eπ
−= < , ˆ 0
( )l
pz
eπ
−= < , 1ˆ 0
( )D
z
eπ= > ,  
   (ˆ
( )p
e lz
eπ
−= ) , and ˆ( )(1 )ˆ
( )e
p ez
e
zπ
π
′− += .     [1.4] 
(Throughout, derivatives are indicated by subscripts in the usual fashion). Recalling 
that ( )eπ is greater than zero. For ˆ ( , )z z z∈ , an increase in the firm’s equity reduces 
the breakeven value of  and the probability that it will be forced to declare 
bankruptcy. Similarly, since the initial allocation of permits is just another asset, an 
increase in the firm’s initial allocation of permits reduces  and the probability that 
it will be insolvent. Of course, an increase in the firm’s debt payment, , increases 
 and the probability the firm will be insolvent. The effect of a change in the price of 
permits on the probability of insolvency depends on whether the firm is a net buyer or 
net seller of permits. If the firm sells permits, an increase in the price of permits 
increases the value of the firm and reduces its bankruptcy risk. If the firm buys 
permits, a price increase raises the likelihood that the firm will be insolvent. Finally, 
the effect of the firm’s level of emissions on the likelihood of insolvency depends on 
the relationship between the permit price and the firm’s marginal profit evaluated at 
. In general, the sign of 
z
zˆ
D
zˆ
zˆ ˆez  is indeterminate, but it is easy to show that it is positive 
when the firm chooses its emissions optimally.  
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  The manager of the firm is risk neutral and chooses the firm’s emissions to 
maximize the expected value of the firm. Denote the expectation of  as ( , )v e z
( , )V e z 3. Therefore, 
   [ ]ˆ ˆ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )(1 ) ( ) ( )z zz zV e z A g z dz e z p e l D g z dzπ= − + + − − −∫ ∫ . [1.5] 
Throughout we assume that  is strictly concave in its emissions for every 
feasible value of , and that the firm optimally chooses a positive level of emissions. 
Note that the firm only considers states of insolvency because it risks losing its equity. 
The limited liability has important consequences for the firm’s optimal choice of 
emissions. We will investigate this in the next section. 
( , )V e z
z
1.3 Bankruptcy Risk and a Firm’s Demand for Emissions Permits 
  In the standard demonstration of the ability of a competitive emissions 
market to distribute individual emissions efficiently, firms maximize profit without 
fearing the possibility of bankruptcy. In our model, if a firm is financially secure, 
zˆ z≤  and [1.5] reduces to ( ) ( )e p e l Dπ − − − . Clearly, the firm takes its equity into 
account when making decisions only when it risks losing it. When there is no such 
risk, the firm chooses its emissions so that )(ep π ′= , which is the familiar condition 
that a firm chooses its permit demand and emissions to equate its marginal abatement 
cost to the going permit price. (Recall that ( ) ( )e c eπ ′ ′= − ). If no firm under an 
emissions trading program faces bankruptcy, their emissions choices equate their 
marginal abatement costs, which forms the set of necessary conditions for minimizing 
                                                        
3 We could model the expected value of the firm in another way,  
[ ]ˆ( , ) 0 ( ) ( )(1 ) ( ) ( )ˆz zV e z g z dz e z p e l D A g z dzzz π= + + − − − +∫ ∫ . There is no material difference between the two forms. 
[1.5] represents the flow of shareholder’s benefits, but this one stands for the stock of it.  
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the aggregate abatement costs of holding aggregate emissions to some exogenous 
level. Moreover, it is obvious that the firm’s choice of emissions does not depend on 
the initial permit allocations. 
  Matters are very different if some firms under an emissions trading program 
risk bankruptcy. Given our assumptions that [1.5] is strictly concave in the firm’s 
emissions and that the firm chooses positive emissions, the following first order 
condition is both necessary and sufficient to uniquely determine its optimal choice of 
emissions: 
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ[ ( )(1 ) ] ( ) ( )[ ( )(1 ) ( ) ] 0e e
z
z
V e z p g z dz z g z e z p e l D Aπ π′= + − − + − − − +∫ = . 
Using the definition of  provided by [1.2], the first order condition simplifies to zˆ
   
ˆ
[ ( )(1 ) ] ( ) 0
z
e z
V e z p g z dzπ ′= + −∫ = .     [1.6] 
Rearranging this equation gives us  
   )]ˆ|(1)[( zzzEep >+′= π ,        [1.7] 
where 
   垐ˆ( | ) ( ) ( )
z z
z z
E z z z zg z dz g z dz> = ∫ ∫      [1.8] 
is the expectation of  (E is the expectation operator) when its distribution is 
truncated on the left at .
z
zˆ 4 Therefore, ˆ( | )E z z z>  is the expectation of  
conditional on the firm being solvent.
z
5 See Appendix for proof. In fact, the right hand 
side of [1.7] is the firm’s expected marginal profit over states in which it avoids 
bankruptcy. Why does the firm ignore states in which it is bankrupt when choosing 
                                                        
4 A financially distressed firm’s choice of emissions in an unregulated setting is determined 
from [1.7] by setting . Doing so yields , the solution to 0p = me ( ) 0eπ ′ = . This is the 
same unregulated level of emissions that the firm would choose if it did not risk bankruptcy. 
5 One should be careful to not interpret )]ˆ|(1)[( zzzEep >+′=π  as the inverse permit 
demand function for a financially distressed firm, because the permit price p appears in 
. ˆ( | )E z z z>
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emissions? It is because its loss in bankrupt states is its constant level of equity, A , 
which does not depend on its choice of emissions. The fixed limit on the firm’s 
bankruptcy liability causes it to choose its emissions to optimize over only the states 
in which it will be solvent. This is analogous to the limited liability effect Brander and 
Lewis (1986) referred to.  
  The presence of ˆ( | )E z z z>  in [1.7] is an adjustment to the firm’s choice of 
emissions that reflects its risk of bankruptcy. When zˆ z≤ , the probability of 
bankruptcy is zero, [1.8] reduces to ( ) 0E z =  because the distribution of  is no 
longer truncated, and [1.7] reduces to 
z
)(ep π ′= . Moreover, since 
ˆ
( ) ( ) 0
z z
z z
zg z dz zg z dz> =∫ ∫  as ˆ ( , )z z z∈ , ˆ( | )E z z z>  is strictly positive when the 
firm risks bankruptcy. This implies that a financially distressed firm will choose its 
emissions so that )(ep π ′> , which implies further that, given the permit price, its 
emissions will be higher than if it did not risk bankruptcy. 
  The fact that a financially insecure firm does not equate its marginal 
abatement costs to the going price of permits leads directly to one of our main results 
about the impact of financial insecurity on the performance of competitive emissions 
trading. That is, an emissions trading program that contains financially insecure firms 
will fail to distribute emissions control in the way that minimizes aggregate abatement 
costs. Accomplishing this objective requires that all firms’ emissions choices equate 
their individual marginal abatement costs. However, firms that risk bankruptcy choose 
levels of emissions so that their marginal abatement costs are lower than the going 
permit price, while those firms that do not risk bankruptcy choose their emissions to 
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equate their marginal abatement costs to the permit price. Moreover, the marginal 
abatement costs among financially distressed firms will differ, because the values of 
will likely vary across these firms and the densities  may vary as well. Since 
the permit market will not equate the firms’ marginal abatement costs, aggregate 
abatement costs will not be minimized. Thus, the main reason for implementing 
emissions trading programs does not hold in situations involving firms that risk 
bankruptcy. 
zˆ ( )g z
  Moreover, the distribution of emissions control will not be independent of the 
initial allocation of permits, because financially distressed firms’ demands for permits 
will depend on their permit allocations. To see why, obtain the comparative static, 
el eee l V V∂ ∂ = − , in the usual manner. Since Vee < 0 by assumption, the sign of e l∂ ∂  
is the same as the sign of . Differentiate [1.6] with respect to  and substitute elV l lˆz  
from [1.4] into the result to obtain ( )( )ˆ( ) '( )(1 ) ( )elV p e e z p gπ π= + − zˆ . To sign this, 
first note that ; that is,  is less than the expectation of  when its 
distribution is truncated at . Furthermore, since 
垐 ( | )z E z z z< > zˆ z
zˆ )]ˆ|(1)[( zzzEe >+′π   
from [1.6],  implies 
0=− p
垐 ( | )z E z z z< > 0)ˆ1)((' <−+ pzeπ . Therefore,  and 0elV <
0e l∂ ∂ < , which reveals that a financially distressed firm’s emissions are decreasing 
in its initial allocation of permits. Intuitively, an increase in a firm’s initial allocation 
of permits increases the value of the firm, all else equal. Since this then reduces the 
risk of bankruptcy of a financially distressed firm, it will choose its emissions so that 
the gap between the permit price and ( )eπ ′  is reduced. In turn this implies lower 
emissions for a given permit price. Thus, a higher allocation of permits to a 
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financially distressed firm reduces its bankruptcy risk and causes it to choose lower 
emissions. 
  To complete this section, let us determine the effect of changes in permit 
price on a financially distressed firm’s optimal emissions. As above, the comparative 
static ep eee p V V∂ ∂ = −  has the same sign as . From [1.6] and  from [1.4] 
obtain 
epV ˆpz
ˆ
ˆ ˆ( ) [ ( )(1 ) ] ( )
( )
z
ep z
e lV g z dz e z p g
e
ππ
− ′= − − + −∫ z . 
Note that the first term of  is negative. However, recall from above that epV
0)ˆ1)((' <−+ pzeπ  so the sign of the second term of  depends on whether the 
firm is a net buyer or seller of permits. If the firm sells permits 
epV
( )e l< ,  and epV
e p∂ ∂  are negative. Thus, if a financially distressed firm sells permits its demand for 
permits is downward sloping in permit price. However, if the firm buys permits 
, the sign of  is indeterminate because its second term is positive. Thus, it 
is possible that the permit demand function for a firm that simultaneously risks 
bankruptcy and optimally chooses to buy permits may be upward sloping. As odd as 
this result appears, it is consistent with a result of Damania and Bulte (2005) who 
found that an increase in regulatory stringency to induce more conservative harvests 
in a fishery can lead to less conservative choices by firms that risk bankruptcy. 
Increased regulatory stringency in our model means that the aggregate cap on 
emissions is reduced and fewer permits are issued. Under most circumstances we 
would expect this to increase the price of permits and lead all firms to reduce their 
emissions. However, a financially distressed firm that is a net buyer of permits may 
react to the reduced cap on aggregate emissions and increased permit price by 
(e l> ) epV
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increasing its emissions.  
1.4 The Initial Allocation of Permits and the Market Effects of Bankruptcy Risk 
  In this section we examine the market effects of bankruptcy risk and limited 
liability, particularly the role that the initial allocation of permits plays in determining 
market outcomes and the allocative efficiency of competitive emissions trading. We 
focus on the initial permit allocation for two reasons. First, increasing the initial 
supply of permits to financially distressed firms reduces their risk of bankruptcy, 
everything else equal. Therefore, we can trace out the effects of varying bankruptcy 
risk on permit markets by varying the initial allocation of permits. Second, in contrast 
to the conventional wisdom that the initial permit allocation does not affect the 
performance of competitive emissions trading, we have just demonstrated that the 
initial permit allocation will certainly impact emissions markets when some firms risk 
bankruptcy. Hence, the initial allocation has efficiency consequences that cannot be 
ignored. 
  In this section we simplify the analysis by assuming that an emissions trading 
program contains just two types of firms, 1 and 2. Type 1 firms do not risk bankruptcy 
while type 2 firms do. There are  identical firms of type = 1, 2. Let , and in i il ie
iπ  denote the initial allocation of permits, emissions, and expected profit function for 
each type  firm. The emissions of a type 1 firm is , the implicit solution to i 1( )e p
1 1( )p eπ ′= , which of course is independent of their initial allocation of permits 
because they do not risk bankruptcy. It is straightforward to show that  is 1( )e p
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monotonically decreasing in p .6 The emissions choice of a type 2 firm is , 
the characteristics of which we explored in the previous section. 
2 2( , )e p l
  With an aggregate supply of permits equal to , the permit market clears if 
and only if 
L
1 1 2 2 2( ) ( , )n e p n e p l L+ = , which implicitly defines the equilibrium price of 
permits as a function of the total supply of permits and the allocation to the financially 
distressed firms; that is, . Differentiate the identity 
 with respect to  and rearrange the result to 
obtain the effect of the allocation of permits to the firms that risk bankruptcy on the 
equilibrium permit price.  
2( , )p L l
1 1 2 2 2 2 2( ( , )) ( ( , ), )n e p L l n e p L l l L+ ≡ 2l
   ( ) ( )2 2 22 1 1 2 2
/n e lp
l n de dp n de dp
− ∂ ∂∂ =∂ +  .      [1.9] 
The numerator of the right hand side of [1.9] is positive because, as we showed in the 
last section . The denominator of the right hand side of [1.9] is the slope 
of the aggregate demand function for emissions permits. In general the impact of 
permit price on the aggregate demand function is indeterminate because of the 
possibility that financial insecure firms’ permit demands increase in the permit price. 
For most of the rest of analysis we assume that the aggregate demand function for 
permits is decreasing in the permit price, because we believe this is the most likely 
case in real applications. We will, however, briefly note the consequences of an 
upward sloping aggregate demand function at the end of this section. Under the 
assumption that the denominator of [1.9] is negative, 
2 2/e l∂ ∂ < 0
2 0p l∂ ∂ < . This indicates that 
                                                        
6 From 1 1( ) 0p eπ ′− =  obtain 1 1 11 ( ) 0de dp eπ ′′= < . The sign follows from the strict 
concavity of 1 1( )eπ . 
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the equilibrium permit price is increasing as the allocation of permits to financially 
distressed firms is reduced. Consequently, higher bankruptcy risk in an emissions 
trading market is likely to produce a higher permit price. 
  In turn, the higher permit price changes the emissions of financially secure 
and insecure firms in opposite directions. Since 1 0de dp < , reducing the initial 
allocation of permits to the financially insecure firms decreases the emissions of the 
financially secure firms through the increase in the permit price. Holding aggregate 
emissions to , then, requires that the equilibrium response of the insecure firms to a 
decrease in their initial allocation of permits is that they increase their emissions. To 
demonstrate this formally, note that 
L
( )( )2 2 /e p p l e l2 2∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂  is the equilibrium 
emissions response of a financially distressed firm to a change in the initial permit 
allocation to these firms. While we have shown that the direct effect, , is less 
than zero, the sign of the indirect effect, 
2 /e l∂ ∂ 2
( )( )2e p p l2∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ , is ambiguous because the 
sign of 2e p∂ ∂  is ambiguous. However, the total effect is negative. To see this 
substitute [1.9] into ( )( )2 2 /e p p l e l∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂2 2  to obtain 
   ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )2 1 2 22 2 2 2 1 1 2 2
/
/ 0
n de dp e l
e p p l e l
n de dp n de dp
∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ = <+ . [1.10] 
Under the assumption that the aggregate demand for permits is downward sloping, the 
sign of [1.10] is negative because 1 0de dp <  and 2 2/e l 0∂ ∂ < . Therefore, increased 
bankruptcy risk can increase the number of permits demanded by financially insecure 
firms, but decrease the number of permits demanded by financially secure firms. 
  Now let us determine how the initial allocation of permits and bankruptcy 
risk affects the efficiency of a permit market in terms of its ability to distribute 
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emissions control to minimize the expected aggregate abatement costs. The total 
abatement costs of the industry can be expressed as 
   ,   [1.11] )]()([)]()([ 2222211111 eeneenTC
mm ππππ −+−=
where recall that and are determined by me1
me2 0)(1 =′ eπ  and 0)(2 =′ eπ . The cap on 
aggregate emissions implies ( )1 2 2 2 2 2( ( , ) ( ( , ), )e p L l L n e p L l l n= − 1 . Substitute this 
into [1.11] and differentiate it with respect to  to obtain 2l
   22 2 1 2
2 2
( ) e pTC l n 2e
p l l
π π ⎛ ⎞∂ ∂∂′ ′∂ ∂ = − +⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ .     [1.12]  
Recall that financially secure firms choose their emissions so that 1 1( )p eπ ′= , but 
firms that risk bankruptcy choose their emissions so that )( 22 ep π ′> . Therefore, 
021 >′−′ ππ  in a market equilibrium. The last term of [1.12] contains the direct and 
indirect effects of changing  on the emissions of type 2 firms, the combination of 
which we have just shown to be negative (equation [1.10]). Therefore, 
2l
2 0TC l∂ ∂ <  
so that the aggregate abatement costs of holding the industry’s aggregate emissions to 
 is decreasing in the initial allocation of permits to firms that risk bankruptcy. 
Consequently, increased bankruptcy risk in an emissions trading program can increase 
the expected aggregate abatement costs. 
L
  To be complete, let us briefly explain how these results change if the 
aggregate permits demand function is increasing in the permit price in equilibrium. In 
this case, a lower permit allocation to financially insecure firms, which means higher 
bankruptcy risk, actually reduces the equilibrium permit price. Consequently, 
financially secure firms increase their emissions while insecure firms decrease 
emissions. Moreover, the sigh of 2TC l∂ ∂  is reversed, indicating that decreasing the 
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allocation of permits to financially insecure firms can reduce the expected aggregate 
abatement costs of the industry. However, we should be aware that these results only 
occur at the extreme case where the aggregate demand function of permits is upward 
sloping. 
1.5 Conclusion 
  Using our results and the monotonic relationship between bankruptcy risk 
and the initial allocation of permits to financially insecure firms, we have generated 
several policy-relevant conclusions about the impact of bankruptcy risk on the 
performance of emissions trading markets. The presence of bankruptcy risk reduces 
the allocative efficiency of competitive emissions trading markets, and makes the 
distribution of individual control responsibility dependent on the initial allocation of 
permits. Thus, the fundamental values of competitive emissions trading programs do 
not hold when some firms in the market risk bankruptcy. Financial insecurity, like 
market power and transaction costs, is yet another problem that can prevent emissions 
markets from fulfilling their theoretical promises. Although we have focused the 
analysis on emissions trading schemes, these results can be safely generated in other 
property rights trading markets, such as ITQ. 
  One may be tempted to use our results to suggest that regulators can use the 
initial distribution of permits to mitigate the inefficiency associated with bankruptcy 
risk. But doing so would not be a trivial undertaking. There are difficulties associated 
with asymmetric information. A regulator must know which firms are in financial 
distress, which may not be readily available. Perhaps more importantly, firms would 
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have the incentive to exaggerate their bankruptcy risk to obtain a greater allocation of 
permits. In addition, financially secure firms would very likely object to allocating 
more permits to insecure firms in the sense that allocating more permits to insecure 
firms would basically be a subsidy for poorly performing firms. Hence, the regulator 
has also to decide whether keeping financially distressed firms in the industry is 
necessary. Finally, using the initial allocation to promote efficient permit markets 
would have to overcome the tendency to allocate permits by some sort of 
grandfathering rule. 
  While we have focused on the performance of tradable permit programs in 
this paper, our results suggest that the inefficiency associated with bankruptcy risk 
will also be present in other market-based policies, and may actually be worse. For 
example, policies with auctioned permits can be viewed as tradable permit programs 
without freely-given initial permit allocations. Since we’ve shown a negative 
relationship between the initial allocation of permits and bankruptcy risk and its 
associated market inefficiency, an auction, which allocates zero permits to all firms, 
would seem to maximize the inefficiency associated with bankruptcy risk. An 
emissions tax would produce the same result. There are good reasons to suspect that 
auctioning permits or taxing emissions would often be more efficient than 
freely-allocated permits, which include their ability to produce revenue that can offset 
distortionary taxes in an economy, and because they may promote more rapid 
technologic change. However, from the singular perspective of the inefficiency caused 
by bankruptcy risk, the free allocation of permits to financially distressed firms may 
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be more efficient than other market-based policies that do not have this feature. 
  There are many other possible extensions of our model and results that are 
likely to be valuable. Let us mention just a few. While we have focused on a static 
model of permit trading, modeling bankruptcy risk in dynamic tradable permit 
markets (that may or may not allow some form of permit banking) would force us to 
examine the impact of financial insecurity on the efficiency of these markets over 
time as well as across firms. We have also assumed a fixed number of firms under a 
tradable property rights regulation. However, financial distress makes the endogeneity 
of the number of firms in an industry and the associated impacts on permit market 
efficiency an important area for future work. Finally, while we have assumed that 
firms fully comply with their output permits, allowing for noncompliance would 
likely yield interesting insights into the relationship between bankruptcy risk and 
compliance choices, and how these market difficulties work together to impact the 
performance of tradable permit programs. Empirical tests of our results would be at 
least as important as any theoretical extension of our model. Does financial insecurity 
actually reduce allocative efficiency in tradable permit markets? In the absence of 
naturally occurring data, testing this hypothesis in a laboratory setting would be a 
straightforward exercise, and would probably lead to further insights into the 
relationship between the financial health of firms and the performance of tradable 
permit markets. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BANKRUPTCY RISK AND IMPERFECTLY  
ENFORCED EMISSIONS TAXES 
2.1 Introduction 
  As a market-based pollution control policy, emissions taxes have attracted a 
wide attention in both theoretical world and policy circles since the early 1970’s. 
Under perfect competition a unit Pigouvian tax of emissions, which is equal to the 
marginal social damage generated by a pollutant, is proved to produce a 
Pareto-efficient allocation of resources. See Baumol and Oates (1975). Given the 
difficulties in estimating damage costs a uniform tax chosen by the authority still 
leads to a reduction in emissions at the least cost possible to the society in the sense 
that it equates marginal abatement costs among polluters. 
  However, with limited resources the enforcement of emissions taxes is 
imperfect and hence leaves firms with the motivation to evade. Harford (1978) was 
the first effort to study the consequences of evadable pollution taxes. In his work, a 
unit tax is applied to the reported emissions and penalties for pollution tax evasion are 
imposed to prevent firms from reporting zero released emissions. It is shown that in 
equilibrium firms’ marginal abatement costs are equal to the unit tax as long as the 
expected punishment induces positive emissions report. This result implies that the 
efficiency of emissions taxes carries over to the case with tax evasion. Moreover, the 
actual level of emissions is independent of enforcement parameters: the penalty on tax 
evasion and the probability of detection. Consequently, aggregate emissions are 
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insensitive to the enforcement strategies of emissions taxes. 
  There also exists a sizable literature concerning the imperfect enforcement of 
another market-based pollution control policy—emissions trading schemes. Malik 
(1990) noted that as long as the probability of being audited is constant as in the case 
of random audits, markets for pollution control still generate efficient distributions 
even with noncompliance. And, actual emissions do not directly depend on the 
enforcement policy in the case of competitive emissions trading. Using laboratory 
experiments, Murphy and Stranlund (2006) confirm that the direct effect of 
monitoring and penalties on emissions choices is zero. Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) 
show that a firm’s level of permit violation, including whether to violate or not, is 
independent of firm-level characteristics, such as prices of outputs and inputs, 
production and abatement technologies, etc. This finding has important implications 
for enforcing emissions trading programs because it suggests that there is no need for 
regulators to target their enforcement efforts on firm-specific parameters. Murphy and 
Stranlund (2007) largely support this result by experimental data. 
  Sandmo (2002) also focuses on the consequences of imperfect enforcement 
on environmental policies. He explores whether the efficiency of emissions taxes with 
imperfect enforcement continues to hold in different situations. It is shown that when 
the probability of detection is endogenous and dependent on actual emissions and 
reported emissions, tax evasion may destroy the appealing efficiency of emissions 
taxes. In the case of risk aversion, even though the release of a pollutant reported by 
noncompliant firms changes emissions taxes could still distribute individual control 
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responsibility efficiently.  
  In this chapter we discuss another situation under which imperfect 
compliance may jeopardize the efficiency property of emissions taxes—bankruptcy 
risk. We examine the features of an imperfectly enforced emissions tax when some 
regulated firms risk bankruptcy. With the continuing application of pollution taxes, it 
is natural for regulators to confront situations involving financially distressed firms. 
Thus, it is important to know how the financial status of regulated firms can impact 
the performance of emissions taxes. As stated in the chapter 1, we are not the first to 
show that financial health of firms affects regulations. Spiegel and Spulber (1994) 
investigate the interactions between the investment and financial decisions of firms 
and a regulator’s control of their output price. Damania (2000) explores the link 
between pollution taxes and the financial and output decisions of firms in an 
oligopolistic industry, but the consequences of noncompliance and the effects of 
bankruptcy risk on emissions taxes is less of his concern. Damania and Bulte (2005) 
relate the harvest decisions of firms in a fishery to their financial structure and 
imperfectly enforced regulatory controls, but they focus on fixed harvest quotas. 
  We demonstrate that the desirable characteristics of an imperfectly enforced 
emissions tax disappear when some regulated firms face the risk of bankruptcy. In this 
case an emissions tax will fail to allocate individual emissions control efficiently. 
Thus, the main reason for implementing emissions taxes does not hold when some 
pollution sources risk bankruptcy. Moreover, firms that risk bankruptcy choose higher 
emissions when they are noncompliant than when they are compliant. Consequently, 
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imperfect enforcement has a negative environmental consequence when some firms 
risk insolvency that is not present when all firms are financially secure. Finally, 
financially insecure firms choose higher violations than financially secure firms. Thus, 
the financial health of firms is an important element in the allocation of scarce 
enforcement resources among firms. The key factor that produces these negative 
results is the well-known limited liability effect of debt financing—financially 
insecure firms ignore returns in bankrupt states because debt holders become the 
residual claimants. Thus, they make their decisions by optimizing only over states in 
which they are solvent.  
  The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In next section we lay out a 
model of a firm that operates under an imperfectly enforced emissions tax and that 
may risk bankruptcy. Because financial security is a special case of this model, we use 
it in section 3 to review the performance of an emissions task when no firm risks 
insolvency, particularly the allocative efficiency of emissions taxes, the independence 
of individual and aggregate emissions on imperfect enforcement, and the 
independence of firms’ violations on their exogenous characteristics. In section 4 we 
demonstrate how each of these results is modified in the presence of financially 
insecure firms. We conclude in section 5.   
2.2 A Model of an Indebted Firm under an Imperfectly Enforced Emissions Tax 
  Throughout we consider an industry composed of heterogeneous, risk neutral 
firms whose emissions are controlled by a uniform emissions tax. Enforcement of the 
tax is imperfect in the sense that it is not sufficient to keep firms from attempting to 
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evade a portion of their tax liabilities. Assume the manager of each firm is controlled 
by shareholders, so the manager of each firm seeks to maximize the expected value of 
the firm. 
  For a particular firm in the industry, given its optimal choices of inputs and 
outputs, the gross profit of the firm (profit excluding its tax and penalty payments) is 
( , )(1 )e zπ β + , where  is the firm’s emissions, e β  is an exogenous factor that 
affects the firm’s gross profit, and  is a continuous random variable that is 
independently, but not necessarily identically distributed among the firms in the 
industry. Each firm’s gross profit function is strictly increasing and strictly concave in 
the firm’s emissions. The random variable  captures the effects of uncertainty on 
the firm’s gross profit, such as the effects of random shifts in the demand for its output 
or in factor prices. The probability density function of  is  with support 
z
z
z ( )g z
[ , ]z z . The expectation of  is zero so that the firm’s expected gross profit is simply z
( , )eπ β . The value of  is revealed only after the firm has made its emissions and 
compliance decisions.  
z
  Each firm’s reported emissions, , are taxed at rate . To check whether the 
firms report their true emission, each of them is audited with a constant probability 
r t
α  that is common knowledge between the regulator and the firm. An audit reveals a 
firm’s actual emissions without errors. A firm is in violation if its actual emissions 
exceed its reported emissions. Since we are concerned with the combined roles of 
financial insecurity and noncompliance in this paper we limit our analysis to 
situations in which a firm’s violation is positive. If an audit reveals that a firm is in 
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violation, a penalty  is imposed. The penalty function is the same for all 
firms, and it is positive, strictly increasing, and strictly convex for positive violations. 
)( ref −
  Like Brander and Lewis (1986), Damania (2000), Damania and Bulte (2005), 
we focus the analysis on a single period in which the financial structure of the firm is 
fixed. A firm’s financial structure is summarized by two variables. One is the firm’s 
equity A , and the other is the firm’s debt obligation D . The firm reimburses 
creditors from net profits. If the firm’s losses exceed its equity, it will declare 
bankruptcy, shut down, and use its equity to partially pay off its debt. Apart from 
losing its equity A , there are no other costs associated with declaring bankruptcy. 
  Given a realization of , the payoff to the shareholders of the firm is z
A   ( , )(1 ) ( )e z tr f e r Dπ β + − − − − + ,     [2.1] 
if it is audited by the regulator, and the payoff is  
   ( , )(1 )e z tr D Aπ β + − − + ,       [2.2] 
if the firm is not audited. From [2.1] and [2.2] we define two critical breakeven states 
of the random variable  in which the firm is indifferent between staying in business 
and ceasing production. If the firm is audited, the breakeven value of , denoted as 
, is determined by setting [2.1] equal to zero and solving for , yielding 
z
z
az z
   ( ) 1
( , )
a tr f e r D Az
eπ β
+ − + −= −
z
.        [2.3] 
The breakeven value of  when the firm is not audited is denoted , and 
determined by setting [2.2] equal to zero and solving for : 
z naz
   1
( , )
na tr D Az
eπ β
+ −= − .          [2.4] 
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Note that  when the firm is noncompliant (i.e., na az z< 0e r− > ), and  
when the firm is compliant (
na az z=
re = ). If the realized value of  is greater than both  
and  the firm will be solvent whether it is audited or not, but if the realized value 
of  is less than both  and  the firm will be insolvent regardless of 
monitoring. If the firm is noncompliant and the realized value of  is between  
and , then the firm remains solvent if it is not audited, but is bankrupt if it is 
audited.  
z az
naz
z az naz
z az
naz
  Note that ( )a
z
z
g z dz∫  and ( )nazz g z dz∫   are probabilities the firm stays in 
business when it is audited and when it is not, respectively. Clearly, these probabilities 
decrease with  and . Thus, if az naz na az z z≤ ≤ , then ( ) ( ) 1a na
z z
z z
g z dz g z dz= =∫ ∫ , 
indicating that the firm is financially secure in the sense that it does not risk 
bankruptcy. However, at the other end of the range of , if z na az z z≤ ≤ , then 
( ) ( ) 0a na
z z
z z
g z dz g z dz=∫ ∫ =  and the firm will definitely go bankrupt. In this case it 
will not even bother to begin production. Despite this possibility, and the possibility 
that a firm will certainly be insolvent if it is audited but may not be if it is not audited, 
we simplify our analysis by assuming that the probabilities the firm is solvent are 
strictly greater than zero. This requires na az z z≤ < .  
  We are now ready to specify the decision problem of the manager of a firm. 
Recall that a manager is risk neutral and chooses his or her firm’s emissions and 
emissions report to maximize the expected value of the firm. Assuming that the 
manager chooses positive emissions report, and violation, his or her decision problem 
is to choose  and r  to maximize e
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[ ]{ }
[ ]{ }
( ) ( ) ( , )(1 ) ( ) ( )
(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( , )(1 ) ( ) .
a
a
na
na
z z
z z
z z
z z
V A g z dz e z tr f e r D g z dz
A g z dz e z tr D g z dz
α π β
α π β
= − + + − − − −
+ − − + + − −
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
 [2.5] 
  The firm’s expected value function consists of two parts; the firm’s expected 
value given that it is audited multiplied by the probability of an audit (the top line of 
) plus the expected value of the firm given that it is not audited times the 
probability that it is not audited (the bottom line of ). It is important to note that 
shareholder-controlled financially insecure firms consider the states of bankruptcy 
when making decisions only because their equity is at stake. But the level of equity is 
fixed. This is the essence of the limited liability effect, which has important 
consequences for the choices of a firm that operates under an emissions tax. 
V
V
  To determine these choices we assume throughout that  is strictly concave 
in  and . Therefore, the following first-order conditions are both necessary and 
sufficient to identify a firm’s optimal emissions and emissions report: 
V
e r
[ ]{ }
{ }
( , )(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , )(1 ) ( )
       (1 ) ( , )(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( , )(1 ) 0;
a
na
a a a
e e e
na na na
e e
z
z
z
z
V e z f e r g z dz z g z e z tr f e r D
e z g z dz z g z e z tr D A
α π β π β
α π β π β
A⎡ ⎤′= + − − − + − − − − +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+ − + − + − − + =⎣ ⎦
∫
∫
[ ]{ }
{ }
( ) ( ) ( ) ( , )(1 ) ( )
       (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , )(1 ) 0.
a
na
a a a
r r
na na na
r
z
z
z
z
V f e r t g z dz z g z e z tr f e r D A
t g z dz z g z e z tr D A
α π β
α π β
⎡ ⎤′= − − − + − − − − +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+ − − − + − − + =⎣ ⎦
∫
∫
 
  Recall that  and  are determined from 
 and 
az naz
( , )(1 ) ( ) 0ae z tr f e r D Aπ β + − − − − + = ( , )(1 ) 0nae z tr D Aπ β + − − + = , 
respectively. Using these relationships to simplify 0eV =  and 0rV =  yields: 
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( , ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )
( ) ( ) 0
a na
a
e e
z z
z z
z
z
V e z g z dz z g z d
f e r g z dz
π β α α
α
⎡ ⎤= + + − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
′− − =
∫ ∫
∫
z
   [2.6] 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )r a a na
z z z
z z z
V f e r g z dz t g z dz g z dzα α α⎡ ⎤′= − − + − =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ ∫ 0 . [2.7] 
Now combine equations [2.6] and [2.7] to obtain  
  
[ ]( , ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
                       ( , ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) 0.
a na
a na
e
e
z z
z z
z z
z z
e t g z dz g z dz
e zg z dz zg z dz
π β α α
π β α α
⎡ ⎤− + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+ + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∫ ∫
∫ ∫ =
 [2.8] 
Our analysis of the effects of bankruptcy risk on imperfectly enforced emissions taxes 
is based on equations [2.7] and [2.8]. 
2.3 Imperfectly Enforced Emissions Taxes When Firms Are Financially Secure 
  In this section we use our model to review some fundamental conclusions 
about imperfectly enforced emissions taxes when firms do not risk bankruptcy. There 
are no new results in this section—some have been shown directly by Harford (1978 
and 1987) and Sandmo (2002), in particular, while others can be gleaned from the 
works of Malik (1990) and Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) who focused on emissions 
trading. These results have to do with the allocative efficiency of an imperfectly 
enforced tax, that individual and aggregate emissions do not depend on whether a tax 
is enforced perfectly or not, and the independence of violations on firm-level 
characteristics. We present all of the results in a single proposition.  
 
Proposition 1: If no firm that operates under an emissions tax risks bankruptcy, then:  
(1) The allocation of individual emissions control is efficient despite imperfect 
enforcement.  
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(2) Each firm’s choice of emissions is independent of their compliance decision. 
(3) Aggregate emissions are unaffected by imperfect enforcement. 
(4) Individual firm’s violations are independent of its exogenous characteristics.  
 
Proof of Proposition 1: If a firm does not risk bankruptcy then na az z z≤ ≤ , which 
implies   ( ) ( ) 1a na
z z
z z
g z dz g z dz= =∫ ∫  and ( ) ( ) 0.a naz zz zzg z dz zg z dz= =∫ ∫  
The latter relationships are due to our assumption that the expectation of  is equal 
to zero. Now substitute these into equations [2.7] and [2.8] to obtain 
z
( )t f e rα ′= −  
and ( , )e e tπ β = , respectively. Allocative efficiency requires that the industry’s 
expected gross profit be maximized given the level of aggregate emissions that is 
induced by the emissions tax7. As is well-known the necessary conditions for this 
maximization problem imply that the firms’ marginal expected gross profits are equal. 
This is achieved because ( , )e e tπ β =  for every firm, each firm faces the same 
emissions tax, and hence, ( , )e eπ β  is equal for every firm. This proves part (1) of the 
proposition. To prove part (2) note that a firm’s choice of emissions is ( , )e t β , the 
implicit solution to ( , )e e tπ β = . Since this decision does not depend on monitoring 
or penalties, it is independent of the firm’s compliance decision. Part (3) follows 
directly from part (2): if individual firms’ emissions are unaffected by imperfect 
enforcement, aggregate emissions are unaffected as well. To prove part (4), write the 
firm’s optimal emissions report as ( )r β . (Writing the firm’s report in this way is not 
meant to suggest that it only depends on β — it also depends on the emissions tax, 
                                                        
7 This is fully equivalent to minimizing the aggregate abatement costs of holding an industry 
to a specific level of aggregate emissions.  
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monitoring, and the penalty function). Given the firm’s optimal choice of emissions, 
( , )e t β , and (t f e r)α ′= −  we have ( ( , ) ( )) 0t f e t rα β β′− − ≡ . Differentiate this 
with respect to β  to obtain ( )( ) 0,f e rβ βα ′′− − =⋅  which implies that the marginal 
effect on the firm’s violation of a change in β  is 0,e rβ β− =  which indicates that 
the firm’s choice of violation is independent of β . Thus, the individual violations of 
financially secure firms are independent of their exogenous differences, suggesting 
that a regulator finds no value in targeting its enforcement effort. The proof is 
complete. QED.  
   
  Before we move to examining how these results change when at least some 
firms in an industry risk bankruptcy, it is worthwhile to be clear about how the results 
depend on two assumptions we maintain throughout this paper. The first is that each 
firm submits a positive emissions report. It is straightforward to show that a 
financially secure firm that reports zero emissions chooses its actual emissions so that 
( , ).et eπ β≥  If this inequality is strict for some firms, then the expected marginal 
gross profits of the firms will not be equalized and aggregate expected gross profits 
will not be maximized. The possibility that a tax regulation will be so poorly enforced 
that some firms report zero emissions seems rather remote. One may also wonder 
whether a real firm would ever reports zero emissions, given that this would send such 
an obvious signal of noncompliance to the regulator. 
  The other assumption that is necessary for Proposition 1 is that the 
probability a firm will be monitored does not depend on its emissions or emissions 
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report. Actually, all that is needed for Proposition 1 to hold is that firms are not 
monitored with probability ( , )e rα  such that e rα α≠ − (Harford 1978 and 1987, 
Sandmo 2002). Under such a monitoring probability firms will choose their emissions 
so that their expected marginal gross profits differ from the tax. This will cause 
expected aggregate gross profit to be less than maximum. For this reason, we do not 
examine such a monitoring strategy in this paper. 
2.4 Imperfectly Enforced Emissions Taxes When Firms Are Financially Insecure 
  In this section we demonstrate how each of the results in Proposition 1 is 
modified in the presence of financially insecure firms. We begin with the allocative 
efficiency of an emission tax when some firms in an industry risk bankruptcy.  
 
Proposition 2: If some firms under an emissions tax risk bankruptcy the distribution 
of individual emissions control will not be efficient.  
 
Proof of Proposition 2: Rearrange equation [2.8] to obtain 
   [ ] ( ) (1 ) ( )( , )
( , ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
a na
a na
e
e
z z
z z
z z
z z
zg z dz zg z dze t
e g z dz g z dz
α απ β
π β α α
+ −− − =
+ −
∫ ∫
∫ ∫ .  [2.9] 
On the right hand side of [2.9], the denominator is positive because ( ) 0a
z
z
g z dz >∫  
and ( ) 0na
z
z
g z dz >∫ . The numerator is also positive. To understand why, recall that the 
expectation of  is zero so that z ( ) 0
z
z
zg z dz =∫ . Since the firm risks bankruptcy, at 
least when it is audited, az z< , implying ( ) 0a
z
z
zg z dz >∫ . If the firm is definitely 
solvent when it is not audited, naz z≤  and ( ) 0na
z
z
zg z dz =∫ . If the firm risks 
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insolvency when it is not audited, naz z<  and ( ) 0na
z
z
zg z dz >∫ . Since 
( ) 0a
z
z
zg z dz >∫  and ( ) 0nazz zg z dz ≥∫  the numerator of the right side of [2.9] is 
strictly positive, implying further that the entire right side of [2.9] is positive.  
  Given that the right side of [2.9] is positive, the equality holds if and only if 
the left side is positive as well. Note that this will be true if and only if ( , ) 0e eπ β >  
and ( , )e e tπ β < . Recall that allocative efficiency requires that each firm choose its 
emissions so that its expected marginal gross profit is equal to the tax. Since 
financially insecure firms choose their emissions so that ( , )e e tπ β <  while those that 
are financially secure choose their emissions so that ( , )e e tπ β = , the distribution of 
emissions in an industry that contains financially insecure firms will not be efficient. 
QED. 
   
  Note that not only will the expected marginal gross profits of firms that risk 
bankruptcy differ from those of firms that are financially secure, expected marginal 
gross profits among financially distressed firms will likely differ because the values of 
 and  vary among these firms, and the densities  may vary as well. 
Since the emissions tax will not equate the firms’ expected marginal gross profits, 
expected industry gross profit will not be maximized. Thus, the main reason for 
implementing emissions taxes does not hold in situations involving financially 
insecure firms. 
az naz ( )g z
  The result that firms that risk bankruptcy choose their emissions so that their 
expected marginal gross profits are less than the tax implies that they choose higher 
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emissions than if they were financially secure. This is due to the limited liability 
effect—since firms that risk bankruptcy do not consider bankrupt states in their 
decisions they optimize over only those states in which they will be solvent. 
Optimization over a restricted range of the random variable  causes them to choose 
higher emissions.  
z
  It is important to note that this result of allocative inefficiency holds whether 
financially insecure firms are also noncompliant or not. We have shown in Chapter 1 
that emissions trading programs with perfect enforcement are inefficient in the 
existence of financially distressed firms. With the next proposition we show that 
imperfect enforcement causes financially insecure firms to choose even higher levels 
of emissions.  
 
Proposition 3: A firm that risks bankruptcy will choose higher emissions if an 
emissions tax is imperfectly enforced than if it is perfectly enforced. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: When an emissions tax is perfectly enforced, a firm chooses 
its emissions to equal its reported emissions ( e r= ). From [2.3] and [2.4], compliance 
implies . Under this condition the firm’s expected value function [2.5] 
simplifies to  
a nz z= a
  ( ) [ ], ( ) ( ) ( , )(1 )na naa na z zz zV e z z A g z dz e z te D g z dzπ β= = − + + − −∫ ∫ ( ) , 
and its optimal choice of emissions satisfies 
  ( ) [ ], ( , ) ( ) ( , ) (na naa nae e ez zz zV e z z e t g z dz e zg z dzπ β π β= = − + =∫ ∫ ) 0 . [2.10] 
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Suppose on the other hand that the emissions tax is imperfectly enforced so that the 
firm is noncompliant. Suppose further that when the firm is noncompliant it chooses 
emissions e  to satisfy equation [2.8]. The proof of the proposition is based on 
evaluating the sign of  at ( ), a naeV e z z= e  and using the strict concavity of 
( ), a naV e z z=  in  to show that the firm’s choice of emissions when it is compliant 
is less than 
e
e .  
  Using [2.10],  evaluated at ( , a naeV e z z= ) e  is  
( ) [ ] ( ) ( ), ( , ) ( ) ( , ) (na naa nae e ee ez zz zV e z z e t g z dz e zg z dzπ β π β⎡ ⎤ ⎡= = − +⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎦ ⎣∫ ∫ ) .⎤⎥⎦  [2.11] 
That e  satisfies equation [2.8] allows us to write it as the identity 
[ ]
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( , ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
                       ( , ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) 0.
a na
a na
e e e
e e e
z z
z z
z z
z z
e t g z dz g z dz
e zg z dz zg z dz
π β α α
π β α α
⎡ ⎤− + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+ + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∫ ∫
∫ ∫ ≡
  [2.12] 
Use [2.12] to substitute for ( , )e e tπ β −  in [2.11] and rearrange terms to show that   
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( , ) .
( ) (1 ) ( )
na a na a
a na
a na
e
e e e e
e
e e
z z z z
z z z z
z z
z z
V e z z
zg z dz g z dz g z dz zg z dz
e
g z dz g z dz
α
π β
α α
=
⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦=
+ −
∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
∫ ∫
  [2.13] 
From the proof of Proposition 2, ( , ) 0e eπ β > . The denominator of [2.13] is also 
positive, so the sign of ( , a naeV e z z= )  is equal to the sign of the term in hard 
brackets. Rearrange this term to show that it has the same sign as 
   ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
na a
na a
e e
e e
z z
z z
z z
z z
zg z dz zg z dz
g z dz g z dz
−∫ ∫∫ ∫ .      [2.14] 
The first term of this difference is the conditional expectation of  given z
[ ( ),naz z e z∈ ] , while the second is conditional expectation of  given z
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[ ( ), ]az z e z∈ . Since ( ) ( )na az e z e<  because the firm is noncompliant at e , the first 
term is less than the second and [2.14] is negative. Since [2.14] has the same sign as 
( ), a naeV e z z= , ( ), 0a naeV e z z= < .
.
 
  The firm’s optimal choice of emissions given that it is compliant is the 
solution to  Since ( ), 0a naeV e z z= = ( ), a naeV e z z=  is monotonically decreasing 
in  and e ( , a naeV e z z= <) 0 , the firm’s choice of emissions when it is compliant is 
less than if it was noncompliant. Thus, imperfect enforcement causes a firm that risks 
bankruptcy to choose higher emissions. QED.  
 
  Since imperfect enforcement causes financially insecure firms to choose 
higher emissions than if the tax was enforced so that the firms were compliant, the 
following proposition follows immediately.  
 
Proposition 4: Imperfect enforcement of an emissions tax leads to higher aggregate 
emissions when some firms under the risk of bankruptcy.  
 
  Recall from Proposition 1 that, under reasonable circumstances, imperfect 
enforcement has no effect on the emissions of financially secure firms. Thus, a 
regulator does not need to be concerned about the environmental impacts of imperfect 
enforcement. However, Proposition 4 reveals that this result does not hold when an 
emissions tax is applied to firms that risk insolvency—imperfect enforcement 
weakens the ability of an emissions tax to improve environmental outcomes when it is 
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applied in a situation involving financially insecure firms.   
  Bankruptcy risk and imperfect enforcement also makes the allocation of 
enforcement effort more complicated. Part (4) of Proposition 1 reveals that differences 
in the violations of financially secure firms are independent of differences in their 
exogenous characteristics. Thus, a regulator does not need to gather information about 
individual firms to target its enforcement effort—only the tax and the enforcement 
parameters, all of which are known by the regulator, determine a firm’s violations. 
This is no longer true when some firms risk insolvency. In particular, the violations of 
financially insecure firms will differ from the violations of financially secure firms.  
 
Proposition 5: Noncompliant firms that risk bankruptcy choose higher violations than 
if they were financially secure.  
 
Proof of Proposition 5: Define ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )a na
z z z
z z za
M g z dz g z dz g z dzα α⎡ ⎤= + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ ∫ . 
Use M to rewrite [2.7] as ( )f e r tM .α ′ − =  If the firm does not risk bankruptcy, 
na az z< ≤ z , which implies ( ) ( ) 1a naz zz zg z dz g z dz= =∫ ∫  and 1M = . Thus, as we 
showed in the proof of Proposition 1, a noncompliant financially secure firm chooses 
its violation so that ( )f e r t.α ′ − =  
  On the other hand, if a noncompliant firm risks bankruptcy, 
( ) ( )a na
z z
z z
g z dz g z dz<∫ ∫ . Since the numerator of M  is a linear combination of 
( )a
z
z
g z dz∫  and ( )nazz g z dz∫ , the fact that the former is less than the latter implies 
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )a na
z z z
z z z
g z dz g z dz g z dzα α+ − >∫ ∫ ∫ a  and 1M > . Therefore, a noncompliant 
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financially insecure firm chooses its violation so that ( )f e r t.α ′ − >  Since  
is strictly convex, this implies that a noncompliant firm that risks bankruptcy chooses 
a higher violation than if it did not risk bankruptcy. QED 
( )f e r−
 
  Armed with Proposition 5, a regulator who is motivated to use its scarce 
enforcement resources to detect and punish firms that tend toward higher violations 
may wish to target its enforcement effort at financially insecure firms. Doing so, of 
course, requires the regulator to gather information on the financial health of all firms. 
At best, gathering this information will add to the cost of enforcing an emissions tax. 
Moreover, the higher aggregate violations that are produced by bankruptcy risk and 
imperfect enforcement may lead to higher costs of sanctioning noncompliant firms. 
Thus, it may very well be the case that bankruptcy risk places more pressure on scarce 
enforcement resources.  
  Note that we have not addressed the point of part (4) of Proposition 1 directly. 
There we showed the independence of parametric differences in firms’ profit 
functions on differences in their violations. Proposition 5 focuses on the role that 
differences in the financial health of firms have on differences in their violations. The 
comparative static relating a parametric change in a financially insecure firm’s profit 
to its violation choice is a very complicated function that has an indeterminate sign. 
(The derivation of this comparative static is available upon request). Thus, the 
violations of firms that risk bankruptcy are not, in general, independent of parametric 
differences in their gross profit functions; in fact, a parametric increase in a firm’s 
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profit function can cause it to choose higher or lower violations. Moreover, the 
comparative static depends on all the parameters of the firm’s decision problem, 
including those involving the enforcement strategy it faces, its financial structure, and 
the uncertainty about its ultimate profit. Since most of these factors involve 
information that is likely to be hidden, a regulator will have a very hard time targeting 
its enforcement effort based on information that determines a firm’s profit function. 
2.5 Conclusions 
  We have examined the combined roles of bankruptcy risk and imperfect 
enforcement on the performance of an emissions tax. In the absence of bankruptcy 
risk in a population of regulated firms, emissions taxes retain their beneficial 
characteristics even when they are not enforced perfectly. Under favorable, but not 
unrealistic conditions, an imperfectly enforced emissions tax produces an efficient 
allocation of individual emissions control; the aggregate level of control is the same as 
under a perfectly enforced tax, and differences in individual violations are 
independent of firm-level differences. All of these characteristics disappear when 
some firms under an emissions tax risk bankruptcy—the allocation of emissions 
control is inefficient, imperfect enforcement causes higher aggregate emissions, and 
financially insecure firms choose higher violations. Thus, the combined effects of 
bankruptcy risk and imperfect enforcement produce higher expected aggregate costs 
of emissions control (or rather, lower aggregate expected gross profits), worse 
environmental quality, and more pressure on scarce enforcement resources.   
  Regulatory options to limit these losses are probably limited to options that 
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reduce the risks of bankruptcy among financially insecure firms. One option, which 
was explored by Damania and Bulte (2006) is to provide direct subsidies to distressed 
firms. This option is fraught with difficulties, including the political difficulty of 
subsidizing polluting firms, and the moral hazard problem that would surely result 
because firms would have an incentive to exaggerate their risk of bankruptcy to obtain 
the subsidy. A more reasonable option might be to allow firms to pollute up to a 
certain level for free before the tax kicks in. This would reduce firms’ tax payments 
thereby reducing the bankruptcy risk of financially insecure firms, and likely lead to 
more efficient outcomes. In Chapter 1 we noted that providing a greater number of 
free tradable emissions permits to insecure firms improved their financial health and 
led to a more efficient distribution of individual emissions choices.  
  It may also be possible to use tax rates and enforcement stringency to achieve 
more efficient outcomes. However, determining how this can be done requires 
determining the comparative statics of how changes in the tax, monitoring, and 
penalties affect firms’ choices of emissions and violations, and these comparative 
statics in our model always have indeterminate signs. As others in this literature have 
found, changing regulatory controls and their enforcement can lead to seemingly 
paradoxical results; for example, higher emissions taxes can cause financially 
distressed firms to increase their emissions, and reducing enforcement stringency can 
promote greater compliance. We should also note that these results depend on the 
private information of firms, including information about their profit functions and 
their financial health. This, even though one can imagine that regulators could 
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minimize the inefficiencies associated with bankruptcy risk with judicious choices of 
tax rates and enforcement strategies, the information requirements of doing so are 
quite severe. 
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APPENDIX: CONDITIONAL EXPECTATION  
  Here we prove that 
ˆ ˆ
( ) ( )
z z
z z
zg z dz g z dz∫ ∫  is the expectation of  
conditional on the firm being solvent. The expectation of  conditional on the firm 
being solvent can be expressed as 
z
z
ˆ
ˆ ˆ( | ) [ ( ) | ]
z
z
E z z z z g z z z dz> = >∫ , where 
 is the conditional probability density function of —the density 
function of  given . We derive this conditional density function by obtaining 
the conditional cumulative density function of , . 
ˆ( ) |g z z z> z
z ˆz z>
z ˆ( ) |G z z z>
  ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) (ˆ ˆ( ) | ( | )
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
P z z m P z m P z zG z z z P z m z z
P z z P z z
)< ≤ ≤ −> = ≤ > = => >
≤  [A.1] 
In [A.1],  is a random point chosen in m ˆ( , ]z z . We get the conditional probability 
density function of  by differentiating [A.1] with respect to . Note that 
is exactly the cumulative density function of , i.e., , whose 
derivative with respect to  is . Thus, 
z m
(P z m≤ ) z ( )G z
m ( )g z
ˆ
( )ˆ( ) |
( )
z
z
g zg z z z
g z dz
> = ∫  and 
ˆ
ˆ ˆ =( | ) [ ( ) | ]z
z
E z z z z g z z z dz> = >∫ ˆ
ˆ
( )
( )
z
z
z
z
zg z dz
g z dz
∫
∫ . 
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